When a complex entity – such as a state (as opposed to a single person) – is involved, self-referential or reflexive obligations are not as aberrant as they seem. States can, in their national laws, limit their own behaviour in all respects. This is exactly what several countries have done in the context of climate change. For example, the United Kingdom (United Kingdom) has passed legislation to make its national emission reduction targets and budgets legally binding. Footnote 21 has thus linked itself to an obligation that it owes to no other state (this is a national matter) to itself, and it is no less a legal obligation to be “unilateral”. Footnote 22 China has done the same with regard to its national emission intensity target, but not by legislation, but by other legal means specific to that country. Footnote 23 It has (legally) committed itself to achieving this goal, which it has set itself. Since no Chinese citizen could sue the government for non-compliance with the target, this is an example of an obligation that, although legally applicable, is not applicable. 49 See, for example. B Mayer, supra 16, p.
49 (“The challenge of implementing the Paris Agreement will be to launch a process capable of encouraging the willingness of each state to take more meaningful action on climate change”); Van Asselt, 16: 10 (“These inputs [for the global inventory] could be used to analyze how NdSCs differ globally from global temperature targets. However, the Paris agreement does not explicitly call for such an analysis. Even if such an analysis were carried out and it discovered that the NPNs were not in line with the objectives of the agreement, it is not known whether and how such a finding of collective effort could affect individual NDCs. One scholar said (wrongly) that the riddle of justice should be solved as a condition for states that agree on a post-2020 treaty: Voigt, C., “Equity in the 2015 Climate Agreement: Lessons from Differential Treatment in Multilateral Environmental Agreements” (2014) 4 (1) Climate Law, p. 50-69, at 51CrossRefGoogle Scholar (`The success of the negotiations under the ADP will depend , among other things, a common understanding of an equitable distribution of efforts and benefits). Such an agreement does not appear in the 2015 Paris Agreement or in the 2018 Paris regulatory framework. 44 They represent only a sample of works in this category. See also Ringius, L., Torvanger, A. – Underdal, A., “Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International Climate Policy” (2002) 2(1) International Environmental Agreements, p. 1-22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Page, E.A., `Distributing the Burdens of Climate Change` (2008) 17(4) Environmental Politics, p.
556-75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Elzen, M. – Hàhne, N., `Sharing the Reduction Effort to Limit Global Warming to 2-C` (2010) 10 (3) Climate Policy, p. 247-60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Huhne, N., Den Elzen, M. Escalante, D., `Regional GHG Reduction Targets Based on Effort Sharing: A Comparison of Studies` (2014) 14 (1) Climate Policy, p. 122-47CrosRefGoogle, Kallbekken, S., Sélen, H. – Underdal, A., Equity and Spectrum of Mitigation Commitments in the 2015 Agreement (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kuramochi, T. et al. , Comparative Assessment of Japan`s Long-Term Carbon Budget under Different Effort-Sharing Principles” (2015) 16 (8) Climate Policy, pp.