The negotiations were successfully concluded on 4 October 2015. Officials from each country signed the agreement on 4 February 2016. The legislative branch of each country had to approve the agreement before it came into force. The agreement eliminated tariffs on most goods traded between countries, promised to reduce further and also cooperate on broader issues such as employment practices, intellectual property and competition policy. The Peterson Institute for International Economics argues that “the ISDS provisions in the TPP are a significant improvement over previous agreements.”  PiIE notes that the ISDS mechanism in the TPP complies with environmental, health and safety rules; Ensure transparency in litigation procedures and eliminates shopping in the forum.  PIIE asserts that some of the innovations contained in the TPP`s ISDS rules “are generally rejected by the U.S. business community.”  Piie asserts that ISDS rules are necessary because they stimulate investment: “Empirical evidence has shown that contracts, including these provisions, have a positive impact on foreign direct investment flows between signatory countries.”  PIIE challenges the assertion that ISDS “lacks integrity to arbitrators” and finds that arbitrators take an oath of impartiality and elect both parties in a case to arbitrators.  PiIE agrees that secrecy has gone too far in many ISDS cases, but notes that “TPP negotiators have opened up greater transparency to these criticisms” and ISDS cases.  Some critics and even supporters of the TPP wanted the agreement to contain measures against nations acting on alleged monetary manipulation, particularly against China.  Daniel Drezner, a professor of international politics at Tufts University, argued, however, that the trade agreement would never involve restrictions on monetary manipulation because it would have limited U.S. monetary policy.  Harvard economist Jeffrey Frankel argued that the inclusion of the language of monetary manipulation in the TPP would be a mistake.
 Frankel noted that monetary manipulation would be difficult to implement (in part because it cannot be said whether a currency is overvalued or undervalued); “monetary manipulation” can often be legitimate; China, often referred to as a major monetary manipulator, is not involved in the TPP; Accusations of monetary manipulation are often worthless; and because it would limit U.S. monetary policy.  Fredrik Erixon and Matthias Bauer of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) write that Tufts` analysis is so flawed “that their results should not be considered reliable or realistic.”  You write that the tufts model “is, on the whole, a demand-driven model, which makes no effort to measure the effects of trade on supply, which are the effects that turn out to be the main positive effects of trade liberalization. What is also problematic is that the model is not designed to assess the impact of trade agreements on trade – in fact, the model is deeply unsuited to such an exercise. No commercial economist, regardless of the school of thought he or she possesses, has ever used this model to make trade estimates. The reason is simple: if a model cannot predict the impact of trade liberalization on trade flows and the profile of trade, it is useless.  They add: “In Capaldo`s analysis, structural changes and the emergence of new industries play no role. Capaldo implicitly assumes that an economy does not react with its work and capital and adapts to new circumstances. New competition only creates new unemployment.
In addition, the impact of barrier reduction on international trade on product and process innovation is overlooked. Finally, Capaldo does not take into account the impact of competition on production costs and prices to the end consumer.  The TPP Agreement establishes a dispute settlement mechanism between investors and states